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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment-TAx DEDUCTION FOR
PARENTS SENDING THEIR CHILDREN TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE-Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v.
Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... 1
The establishment clause is the first of the two first amendment religion
clauses. The simplicity of its expression belies the difficulty encountered in
its interpretation. 2 During the last thirty years the Court has labored to
formulate principles and guidelines to determine the constitutionality of
legislation challenged under the establishment clause. 3 Although the Su-
preme Court has stated that little further refinement of these principles is
needed, 4 the Court may again find it necessary to address the issue of the
permissibility of state financial assistance to the parents of children attending
sectarian schools.5 Recently, in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer 6
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (a challenge to tax exemptions for
churches), in which the Court stated, "[t]he Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution."
3. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Supreme Court held that a school
district could reimburse private school parents for the costs of transporting their children to
school. Both public and nonpublic parents benefited from the aid. In Everson, the Supreme
Court defined the establishment clause for the first time:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance.
Id. at 15-16.
4. As Justice Blackmun stated, when delivering the Court's opinion in Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976): "So the slate we write on is anything but clean., Instead,
there is a little room for further refinement of the principles governing public aid to church-
affiliated private schools." Id. at 754.
5. In addition to those cases in which the Court has considered the constitutionality of
state statutes providing financial aid to private schools (see note 39 and accompanying text
infra), the Court has heard a number of cases involving establishment clause attacks involving
religious activities in the public schools. The Court has not looked favorably upon state spon-
sored religious practices in the public schools. In Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), a Baltimore school district rule provided for Bible reading at the beginning
of each school day. The Court held that such a religious practice was unconstitutional. In its
opinion the Court noted, however, that the objective study of the Bible or of religion as part of
the secular curriculum was not prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 225. Similarly, a required
morning recitation of prayer in the schools of New Hyde Park, New York, was held unconstitu-
tional in Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
The Court has ruled on programs releasing students from public schools for religious instruc-
tion with differing results. In McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), public school
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(M.C.L.U.), a three judge district court 7 held, with one dissent, that the
establishment clause did not bar Minnesota from allowing a state income tax
deduction for tuition, transportation, textbook, instructional materials, and
equipment expenses incurred by parents whose children were enrolled in
private schools. 8
This Note will discuss the principles and guidelines developed by the
Supreme Court in its analyses of state school aid cases. It will analyze the
reasoning in M.C.L.U. and will demonstrate the inconsistency of that
reasoning with current Supreme Court doctrine. Additionally, it will discuss
state and national implications of the M.C.L.U. decision.
THE FACTS
In 1971, the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute providing a state in-
come tax credit for the parents and legal guardians of children attending
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. 9 That statute was declared
unconstitutional by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974 because it had
the primary effect of advancing religion.' 0 Subsequently, in 1976, the leg-
islature amended a 1955 statute allowing a state income tax deduction of up
to $200 to parents of students attending either public or nonpublic schools."
The deduction under the original statute covered costs that parents incurred
students received religious instruction from religious teachers who came into the public schools.
The Court held the practice unconstitutional. It was troubled by the use of public school build-
ings for religious instruction and by the use of the state's compulsory attendance machinery to
aid in the provision of pupils. Id. at 212.
Four years later, however, in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Supreme Court
held constitutional a New York City program permitting public schools to release students dur-
ing the school day to receive religious instruction given off school grounds. The Court's opinion
stated that "[w]hen the state encourages religious instruction or cooperation with religious au-
thorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions." Id. at 313-14.
In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court struck down a state law prohibiting
the teaching of evolution. The Court held the purpose of the law was to suppress the teaching
of evolution because it conflicted with the Biblical view of creation. Id. at 107. Such a purpose
was sectarian and violative of the establishment clause. Id. at 109.
6. 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978).
7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976), a direct appeal can be made to the Supreme Court
from three-judge district courts.
8. The 1976 Amendment also required that eligible schools meet Minnesota state require-
ments and be in compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compliance with the Civil Rights
Act was probably required in response to Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). In Nor-
wood, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for a state to loan textbooks to
students attending racially discriminatory private schools.
9. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.086 (West Supp. 1978).
10. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 224 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 988 (1975).
11. Enacted as 1955 Minn. Laws, ch. 741, the provision reads:
The following deductions from gross income shall be allowed in computing net in-
come:
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for the transportation and tuition of their dependents enrolled in elementary
and secondary schools. 1 2  The amended statute raised the deduction ceiling
to $500 for each dependent in kindergarten through sixth grade, and to $700
for each dependent in seventh through twelfth grade. 13 Under this
amendment, deductible expenditures were expanded to include the costs of
secular textbooks, instructional materials, and equipment. 14
The 1976 amendment prompted a challenge to the law on establishment
clause grounds by the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, and seven Minnesota taxpayers. 15 Plain-
tiffs limited their challenge to whether the deduction allowed sectarian
school parents for tuition, instructional materials, and equipment had the
impermissible effect of advancing religion. 16 Finding that the stat-
ute did not have such an impermissible effect, the district court held it
constitutional. 17
(19) The amount he has paid to others for tuition of each dependent and the cost of
transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary or secondary school;
provided that the deduction for each dependent shall not exceed $200.
12. Id.
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09, Subd. 22 (West Supp. 1978), reads:
The following deductions from gross income shall be allowed in computing net in-
come.... Subd. 22. Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to
others, not to exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each
dependent in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks, and transportation of each de-
pendent in attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin wherein a resident of this state
may legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall
mean and include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in
elementary and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and com-
monly taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not
include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets,
doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
worship.
14. Id.
15. In Frothingliam v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Supreme Court ruled that a federal
taxpayer did not have a sufficient interest in federal spending to challenge the disbursement of
monies. However, Frothingham was limited by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Flast, an
establishment clause challenge to the constitutionality of Titles I and II of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, standing was granted to federal taxpayers. To have standing,
two requirements had to be met. First, the challenge must be made only to an exercise of
Congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of article I, § 8 of the Constitution.
Secondly, the taxpayer must demonstrate that in enacting the legislation Congress exceeded a
constitutional limitation on its article I, § 8 power, not that it was without any power to so
legislate. Id. at 102-3. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of Frothingham and
Flast, see R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1974).
16. 452 F. Supp. at 1318. The original statute was unchallenged. However, in testimony
before the Minnesota Senate Taxes and Tax Laws Committee, a spokesperson for Americans
United for Separation of Church and State and the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (M.C.L.U.)
stated that should the deduction ceiling be increased, a constitutional challenge might ensue.
Tape of Taxes and Tax Laws Committee Meeting, April 14, 1975 (7:00 PM).
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NEUTRALITY: THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLE
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The establishment clause requires the federal and state governments to
be neutral in their dealings with religion and religious institutions. I8 Neu-
trality does not, however, require a total separation of church and state. 19
The state can pay clerics and contract with a religious order for the perfor-
mance of secular activities.2 0 General welfare programs, such as police or
fire protection, can incidentally benefit religious institutions. 2 1 Thus, the
state's interest in education allows it to provide transportation 2 2 and secular
textbooks 23 to children even though they may attend a sectarian school.
Neutrality does require, however, that the state not sponsor or promote re-
ligion. 24
In oral arguments, plaintiffs apparently conceded that if a state could directly provide trans-
portation and textbooks for parochial school children, it could indirectly subsidize these items
through a tax deduction. Although superficially reasonable, this conclusion overlooks the guiding
principle of neutrality in state aid cases. In those instances where the Supreme Court has
allowed direct aid to the parents of, poor children attending parochial schools, public school
children or their parents also benefited. Most importantly, there has been no distinction in
the method of providing the benefit to private or public school beneficiaries. Thus, the district
court erred in assuming "that a statutory deduction for parental expenditures to purchase these
items is constitutionally proper." 452 F. Supp. at 1318. See note 44 infra.
17. 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Neutrality has been a concern of the
Court in all the various types of establishment clause cases which have come before it. See,
e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
20. The state can pay clergymen elected to legislatures any salary or remuneration paid
other legislators. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 n.13 (1976).
In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), the Commissioners of the District of Columbia
had contracted with a religious order of nuns to build an addition to their hospital, provided
two-thirds of the capacity of the addition would be reserved for poor patients sent there by the
Commissioners. The Court held that payment of the funds by the treasury department to fulfill
the contract was not a violation of the establishment clause.
21. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968).
22. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a more detailed discussion of Ever-
son, see note 3 and accompanying text supra.
23. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Allen the Supreme Court upheld a
New York program requiring local school districts to lend textbooks to all secondary school
students, including those attending sectarian schools. Allen, however, was not the first case to
come before the Court challenging state provision of textbooks to private school children. In
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), a state program providing free
textbooks for all school children was challenged as a deprivation of property for a private pur-
pose, violating the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that the state had a legitimate
public purpose, the education of its children, in utilizing its taxing powers to supply the
textbooks. Hence, the statute was constitutional. Id. at 375.
24. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). In formulating its neutrality principle,
the Court has recognized that the roots of the establishment clause lie in pre-Constitutional
history. The Court has been cognizant of the sensitivity of the Founding Fathers toward the
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The Supreme Court has formulated a tripartite test to determine whether
challenged legislation meets this neutrality standard. To pass Constitutional
muster under the establishment clause, legislation must first have a secular
legislative purpose. 25  Second, its principle or primary effect must neither
advance nor impede religion. 26 Third, it must avoid excessive governmental
entanglement with religion. 27  The M.C.L.U. court acknowledged this
abuses engendered by governmental establishment of religion, both in Europe and in colonial
America, particularly "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
In 1785-86, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson led the fight against renewal of Virginia's
tax levy to support Christian teachers. To attract support, Madison wrote his Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments. The tax levy was ultimately defeated. Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 12 (1947). The Everson Court stated that "[t]his Court has previously
recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which
Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to
provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia
Statute." Id. at 13.
A somewhat different interpretation of the establishment clause has been suggested in W.
KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963), in light of the fact that at the time of
the drafting of the first amendment, a number of states had established churches. Katz argues
that the first amendment was meant not only to prohibit Congress from establishing religion,
but to prevent Congress from disestablishing any state religions as well. Id. at 7-10.
25. Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Although secular
legislative purpose is required of any legislation challenged under the establishment clause, it
has not proved instrumental in striking down legislation involving state aid to private sectarian
schools. The Court has accepted a variety of legislative purposes as valid, even those relating to
legislation it has ultimately found impermissible. 'Furtherance of the educational opportunities of
young people has been cited in a number of cases as the secular purpose of the legislation.
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Enhancement of the quality of education was cited in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1911). Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), gave the provision of
health and educational opportunities as the purpose of the legislation before it. Reducing the
costs of public education was the legislative purpose in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
Health and safety concerns were the factors behind the challenged legislation in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. Id. Under the primary effect test, a law which has the primary effect of promoting a
legitimate secular purpose can still be found unconstitutional if it also has the direct and im-
mediate effect of advancing religion. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973). In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Court
upheld federal construction grants to sectarian colleges, but struck down a provision which
might allow the structures to be used for secular purposes twenty years later. That provision
was found unconstitutional because it might "in part have the effect of advancing religion." 403
U.S. at 683. For extensive discussion of the primary effect test, see notes 33-52 and accompany-
ing text infra.
27. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S, 602 (1971). The third inquiry made by the Court in an
establishment clause challenge, is the degree of entanglement the legislation will cause between
the government and religion or religious institutions. Entanglement can be either administrative
or political.
Administrative entanglement results from excessively frequent governmental contacts with, or
surveillance of religion or religious institutions. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Political entanglement results from controversial legislation which might cause divisions be-
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three-prong test as the established guideline to be applied. 28 Although
plaintiffs in their oral argument had conceded that the Minnesota statute
satisfied the first and third tests, 29 they argued that the Minnesota statute
had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. 30 Consequently, the dis-
trict court limited its analysis to the primary effect issue. 3 '
ASSESSING THE PRIMARY EFFECT:
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
In undertaking its primary effect analysis in cases involving state aid to
private schools, the Supreme Court has not focused on the permissibility of
the form of the aid provided by the challenged legislation.3 2 In fact, it has
specifically stated that the form of the aid is not controlling in these cases. 33
Rather, the Court has based its primary effect analysis on a consideration of
the propriety of two factors: the nature of the beneficiary aided and the
employment of the aid.3 4
One category of beneficiary considered by the Court has been the sec-
tarian institution. The Court has specifically stated that no aid may be pro-
tween citizens along religious lines. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For criticism of
the entanglement test as an invalid distortion of the intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights,
see Weber, School Aid and Political Divisions, 38 JURIST 203 (1978).
28. 452 F. Supp. at 1318.
29. Id. See discussion in note 16 supra.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See note 24 infra.
33. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976). Additionally, the Court
stated that its decisions in school aid cases are better reconciled "in terms of the character of
the aided institution.'" Id. It is no wonder that the M. C.L. U. court lamented that "there appears to
be no discernible consistency in the decisions of the [Supreme] Court in Establishment Clause
challenges to state school aid." 452 F. Supp. at 1320. Some commentators have agreed with
M.C.L.U. that the Court has been inconsistent in its interpretation of the establishment clause.
For a discussion suggesting that the inconsistency has resulted in the preeminence of disestab-
lishment values over free exercise values, see Fink, The Establishment Clause According to the
Supreme Court: The Mysterious Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 207
(1978).
34. The Supreme Court has never specifically articulated that the primary effect test should
apply this two factor analysis. However, such a conclusion is inferred from the Court's charac-
terization of aid having the primary effect of advancing religion.
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of
its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically
religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (emphasis added). To compare challenged legislation
with the Hunt characterization would necessitate focusing on the institution aided and the
employment of the aid. For an example of the Court's application of the process, see Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-59 (1976) (discussed in note 41 infra). Additionally, the
Court has discussed the importance of each factor individually in its cases. See, e.g., Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (nature of the institution); Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973) (employment of the aid).
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vided to a pervasively sectarian institution whose religious mission per-
meates all of its activities. 35 Thus, the Supreme Court has held unconstitu-
tional a state law authorizing the loan of instructional materials and equip-
ment to religion-pervasive elementary and secondary schools. 36  The
Supreme Court concluded that the massive aid provided to the educational func-
tion of these schools unavoidably aided their religious mission as well. 37  In
35. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
36. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). A better understanding of the characteristics of
a pervasively sectarian institution can be gained by reading the allegations filed in the complaint
at the district court level in Meek. These allegations were included in the Supreme Court's
opinion. The complaint alleged that the aided schools:
(1) are controlled by churches or religious organizations, (2) have as their purpose
the teaching, propagation and promotion of a particular religious faith, (3) conduct
their operations, curricula and programs to fulfill that purpose, (4) impose reli-
gious restrictions on admissions, (5) require attendance at instruction in theology and
religious doctrine, (6) require attendance at or participation in religious worship, (7)
are an integral part of the religious mission of the sponsoring church, (8) have as a
substantial or dominant purpose the inculcation of religious values, (9) impose re-
ligious restrictions on faculty appointments, and (10) impose religious restrictions on
what the faculty may teach.
Id. at 356 (quotation marks omitted).
In M.C.L.U. some parents claiming the educational deductions sent their children to schools
having similar characteristics. The Stipulation of Facts asserted that some of these schools:
A. Have as one of their primary purposes the teaching, propagation or promotion of
a particular religious faith;
B. Conduct the sectarian portion of their operations, curricula and programs to ful-
fill that purpose;
C. Require attendance at courses in religious doctrine or religious worship services
for those pupils of the same faith as that of the sponsoring church or organiza-
tion;
D. Are an integral part of the religious missions of the sponsoring churches or
religious organizations;
E. Contain religious symbols evident to students who attend said schools;
F. Direct their teachers to limit certain subjects to be within the tenets of the
particular religion.
Stipulation of Facts 8 (A-F) at 3-4.
37. 421 U.S. at 365. In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court spoke of
the twin goals of religious schools: religious and secular education. The Court could not assume,
based on the record before it in Allen, that "all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that
the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks fur-
nished . . . by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion." Id. at 248.
However, in later cases the Court referred to the "substantial religious character of these
church-related schools," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971), and the likelihood that
in religious primary and secondary schools "religion [would] permeate the area of secular educa-
tion," Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971). The doctrinal tension caused between
Allen and later cases has caused at least one Justice to question Allen's present validity. See
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 257 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Although the Court's characterization of sectarian elementary and secondary schools has var-
ied at times, it has never held constitutional attempts by states to provide aid directly to sectar-
ian elementary and secondary schools. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (the loan of
instructional material and equipment); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Lib-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:543
contrast, the Court has not considered sectarian colleges and universities
pervasively sectarian. 38 For example, statutes providing direct grants to re-
ligiously affiliated colleges and universities have been upheld by the Court.39
A second category of beneficiary considered by the Supreme Court has
been sectarian school children 40 or their parents. 41  The Court has em-
erty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for state mandated testing utilizing teacher developed
tests); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (grants
for the maintenance and repair of school facilities and equipment); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (partial reimbursement of the costs of teachers' salaries paid to the schools and
partial payment of teachers' salaries paid directly to the teachers). The Court held the above
provisions unconstitutional for having the primary effect of advancing religion (Levitt, Nyquist),
or for involving an excessive governmental entanglement with religion (Lemon), or both (Meek).
38. The Court has upheld direct grants to sectarian universities because it has felt that
there are significant differences between church-related colleges and universities, and sectarian
elementary and secondary schools. In making this distinction, the Court has noted that the
"skepticism of the college student" would serve as a barrier to religious indoctrination. Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971). Additionally, the academic freedom present in church-
related colleges and universities would ensure an atmosphere of free inquiry. Id. However, the
Court has intimated that direct aid given to a college or university found to be pervasively
sectarian could be held unconstitutional. Id. at 682.
39. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Supreme Court upheld construction
grants to church-related colleges and universities. In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736 (1976), the Court upheld a state statute authorizing noncategorical grants to any private
college or university, excluding those only awarding seminarian or theological degrees. The
money could only be used by the schools for secular purposes.
40. Utilizing the theory that the child, and not the institution he or she attended, was the
true beneficiary of the aid, several states have successfully provided aid to their parochial school
students. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (free textbook loan, standardized testing,
health services given on private school grounds, and remedial services given off the private
school grounds, permissible); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (free textbook
loan); Everson v. Allen, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation). In each of the above cases the
wording of the statute specifically authorized the child as the recipient of the aid, and not the
parochial school.
Merely designating the child as the recipient of the statute's aid has not guaranteed a finding
of constitutionality. In Wolman, in addition to the aid cited above, Ohio authorized the expendi-
ture of funds for field trips for nonpublic school students. The Court found, however, that as
the nonpublic schools, and not their students, controlled all aspects of planning and implement-
ing the trips, the schools were the true recipients of the aid. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
253 (1977). Having made that determination the Court held the aid unconstitutional as there
could be no guarantee that the teacher would not incorporate sectarian views into the experi-
ence without excessive governmental surveillance. Id. at 254.
In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the provision of
remedial services to parochial school students in the parochial school facilities was impermissi-
ble. Again, the Court stated that ensuring that the remedial teachers confined their instruction
to the secular would require excessive governmental surveillance. Id. at 370. Thus, in both
instances the aid provided was unconstitutional because the excessive governmental surveillance
needed to ensure its secularity would result in an impermissible entanglement of government
and religion.
41. Attempts at providing aid to the parents of parochial school children have not fared as
successfully as measures providing aid to their children. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition reimbursement and tax benefits to
private school parents, unconstitutional). For a more extensive discussion of Nyquist, see notes
46-49 and accompanying text infra.
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phasized that they may only benefit from state aid statutes commonly aiding
all students or all parents. 42  Additionally, the Court has stated in dicta
that the provision of aid which acts to reward parents for sending their chil-
dren to religious schools is impermissible. 43
In addition to analyzing the beneficiaries of state aid measures, the Court
has carefully scrutinized the employment of the aid provided. Two Supreme
Court cases particularly stress the importance the Court has placed on an
analysis of this factor. In Committee for Public Education and Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist,44 a New York statute provided for direct maintenance and
repair grants to private schools. Additionally, it allowed private school par-
ents either a partial tuition reimbursement or a tax credit for tuition paid.
45
The Court noted that maintenance and repair grants and unrestricted tuition
benefits could encompass both secular and sectarian activities. 46  As the stat-
Similarly, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania attempt at parental reimbursement. On June
28, 1971, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), invalidating a Pennsylvania law allowing the state to partially reimburse parochial schools
for the salaries of their teachers. On August 27, 1971,. the Pennsylvania General Assembly
enacted a new law providing funds to partially reimburse parents for the tuition costs of their
children attending private schools. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 826 (1973). Dismissing the
State's argument that the aid primarily benefited parents and only incidentally benefited pri-
vate schools, the Court held the act unconstitutional. The Court stated the Pennsylvania law
was constitutionally indistinguishable from Nyquist and thus had the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion. Id. at 828.
42. The Court has emphasized that sectarian school students and their parents may only
benefit from state aid statutes commonly aiding all students or all parents: "Bus transportation,
school lunches, public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students
[are] not thought to offend the Establishment Clause.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
616-17 (1971) (emphasis added). In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 n. 12 (1975), the Court
approvingly discussed the lower court decision of Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger,
358 F. Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 961 (1974). The Supreme Court noted that in
Marburger the district court invalidated a New Jersey law allowing parents of nonpublic school
children to be reimbursed for the money they spent to purchase their children's secular
textbooks. Public school students were only loaned textbooks, however. Thus, the reimburse-
ment program afforded a benefit to nonpublic school parents not extended to public school
parents. 421 U.S. at 362 n.12. For lower court rulings holding that a distinction in the method
of providing benefits to public and parochial school children or their parents is unconstitutional,
see Members of Jamestown School Comm. v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338 (D. R.I. 1977);
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Benton, 413 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Iowa
1975); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), aff'd, 417
U.S. 961 (1974).
43. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973).
44. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
45. Under the tuition reimbursement provision only parents with an annual income of less
than $5,000 were eligible for reimbursement. Reimbursement was limited to $50 for each grade
school child and $100 for each high school child. In any event, the amount received could not
exceed 50% of the tuition paid. Id. at 764.
The tuition credit plan allowed parents with an adjusted gross income of less than $25,000 to
subtract from that income an amount specified on a pre-determined table. The amount given on
the table bore no relationship, necessarily, to the amount of tuition paid, but rather was depen-
dent on the parents' gross income. Id. at 765-66.
46. Id. at 774-75, 780.
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ute did not limit the aid to secular activities, the Court held it unconstitu-
tional.4 7 Relying on Nyquist, the Court in Wolman v. Walter4 s invalidated
the loan of instructional materials and equipment to children attending sec-
tarian schools because their use could not be restricted to secular ac-
tivities.4 9 However, the Court has allowed bus transportation, school
lunches, public health services, and secular textbooks to be supplied to pri-
vate school children due to the secular nature of these items.5 0
Thus, the primary effect test requires that any school aid provided by the
state must benefit only non-pervasively sectarian institutions or commonly
benefit public and nonpublic school children or their parents. Additionally,
aid provided to these acceptable categories of beneficiaries must be employed
in secular activities only and must be incapable of diversion to sectarian
purposes. As Nyquist illustrated, statutes not conforming to either of these
guidelines have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court for having
the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S PRIMARY EFFECT ANALYSIS
The district court in M.C.L.U. framed its primary effect analysis in terms
of the beneficiary aided and the form of the aid provided by the Minnesota
statute. 51 The court, however, gave little scrutiny to the beneficiaries aided
by the statute, noting that both public and non public school parents making
eligible expenditures could claim the deduction. 52  The court recognized,
however, that a statute benefitting both public and nonpublic school parents
could be unconstitutional if it aided religious activities.53 In its opinion the
court stated that it was unclear whether the Minnesota statute aided reli-
gious activities. 54 Therefore, the court turned its attention to the form of the
aid provided. The court concluded that the permissibility of the statute
rested on whether the deduction mechanism advanced the religious function
of affected sectarian schools. 55
47. Id. at 774, 794, 798.
48. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
49. Id. at 250-51. In Wolman the Court admitted that tension existed between the results
reached in Wolman and Allen. It seemed unlikely that the secular use of textbooks could be any
more guaranteed than the secular use of instructional materials or equipment. The Court noted,
however, that a presumption of secularity had been extended to textbooks provided private
school children if the books were limited to those provided public schools. Id. at 215 n.18.
Furthermore, the Court refused to again extend that presumption stating that "[w]hen
faced . . . with a choice between extension of the unique presumption created in Allen [sic] and
continued adherence to the principles announced in our subsequent cases, we choose the latter
course." Id.
50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
51. For a discussion of the little weight the Supreme Court has accorded the form of the aid
provided by the state, see note 34 and accompanying text supra.






Because the district court narrowed its inquiry to the permissibility of the
form of aid provided, it principally limited its review to cases involving es-
tablishment clause attacks on tax statutes benefitting religion or religious in-
stitutions. It noted that the Supreme Court had never ruled on the constitu-
tionality of charitable deductions for religious purposes. 56 However, the
Court in Walz v. Tax Commission 57 had ruled that a statute granting a tax
exemption for property used for religious purposes was constitutional, as it
provided only incidental aid to religion. 58 This differed from the Court's
ruling in Nyquist that tuition tax credits for parochial school parents were
unconstitutional. 59 The M.C.L.U. court reconciled these rulings by con-
cluding that tax credits aiding a sectarian function were forbidden, while tax
exemptions aiding a sectarian function were not. 60 Hence, the Court
reasoned that the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute turned on
whether tax deduction aid should be categorized with the permissible aid
provided by tax exemptions or the impermissible aid provided by tax
credits. 6 1
In its consideration of this issue, the court turned to Kosydar v. Wol-
man,6 2 a three judge district court decision. Kosydar held an Ohio tax credit
plan for nonpublic school parents unconstitutional.6 3  In dictum, the Kosydar
court commented that tax credits were a more direct form of aid than tax deduc-
tions.64 Elaborating on this point, the M. C.L.U. court noted that parochial school
parents would not as automatically benefit from the availability of a tax deduc-
tion as they would from a tax credit provision.6 5  A benefit would accrue
only if the parents made eligible deductions, itemized deductions, had a
56. Id.
57. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
58. 452 F. Supp. at 1321.
59. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794, 798
(1973).
60. 452 F. Supp. at 1321. The district court's conclusion that tax exemptions aiding a sectar-
ian function are permissible is contradictory to the Supreme Court's admonition that only
secular activities can be aided by the state. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 747 (1973). See
notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
61. 452 F. Supp. at 1321.
62. 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd mem., sub nor., Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S.
901 (1973).
63. Id. at 762.
64. Id. at 763. The Kosydar court felt credits were a more direct form of aid than deduc-
tions because credits reduced the tax paid to the state, while deductions only reduced the
taxable income. Id. Thus, a taxpayer would definitely benefit from a credit. A tax deduction
would only be beneficial if the taxpayer was placed in a lower tax bracket. This argument
was successfully made by defendants in M.C.L.U. See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
However, it should be noted that even though a tax deduction would not necessarily place a
taxpayer in a lower tax bracket, the taxpayer's taxable income base would nevertheless be re-
duced. Thus, the argument could be made that any tax deduction would directly benefit a
taxpayer who claimed it.
65. 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
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taxable income after deductions, and the deduction placed them in a lower
tax bracket. 66  A tax credit provision, however, would allow parents to sub-
tract a predetermined amount directly from their tax bill.6 7 Thus, the court
concluded that the Minnesota deduction was a much less direct form of aid
than the Nyquist credit scheme. 68 Being an indirect form of aid, the deduc-
tion, like the tax exemption, only incidentally benefitted religion, and was
therefore constitutional.6 9
To further support its conclusion, the M.C.L.U. court enumerated two
non-economic reasons for distinguishing Nyquist and relying on Walz. First,
the statute in Walz did not limit exemptions to property used for religious
purposes but was directed to a broad spectrum of charitable, educational, and
religious purposes. 70 In Nyquist, however, only parents of nonpublic school
children were eligible for the tax benefits. 7 1 The court reasoned that the
breadth of the benefitted class in M.C.L.U. was similar to the breadth of the
class benefitted in Walz, 72 since the Minnesota statute allowed the deduc-
tion to parents of children in both public and private schools.
Secondly, in both Walz and Nyquist the Supreme Court had referred to
the long historical acceptance accorded a tax exemption for property used for
religious purposes as a factor suggesting its constitutionality. 73 In contrast,
the Nyquist Court had noted that educational, tax credits were of relatively
recent vintage. 74  The M.C.L.U. court stated that the Minnesota statute
should also benefit from the Walz historical acceptance rationale, 75 as it had
been enacted in 1955, and the deduction it provided was analogous to the
historically accepted charitable deduction. 76
Thus, finding Walz controlling, the M.C.L.U. court concluded that the
Minnesota statute did not have the impermissible effect of advancing reli-
gion. It was neutral, neither advancing nor impeding religion; it benefited
parents of children attending both public and nonpublic schools; and finally,
it had received unchallenged historical acceptance. 77
66. Id. at 1321.
67. For a discussion of tax credits by the Supreme Court in the context of state aid cases,
see 413 U.S. at 789.
68. The court specifically stated "that the relationship between the tax relief and the
economic benefit to the religious function of the affected sectarian schools is much more remote
than was the case with the credit systems invalidated in the previously cited opinions." 452 F.
Supp. at 1321-22.
69. 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
70. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
71. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 765 (1973).
72. 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
73. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973).
74. Id.
75. 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
76. id.
77. Id. at 1322.
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CRITICISM OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS
The M.C.L.U. court was confused in its application of the Supreme
Court's establishment clause doctrine in state aid cases. 78 Finding no con-
sistency in Court precedents, it concluded its only alternative was to choose
between the two Supreme Court cases it considered most germane. 79 Thus,
a determination of whether Walz so or Nyquist 81 controlled comprised the
heart of the court's analysis. 82 Unfortunately, the court's failure to carefully
scrutinize the beneficiary aided and the employment of the aid provided by
the Minnesota statute led it to conclude incorrectly that Walz controlled.
First, the M.C.L.U. court should have made a more careful inquiry into
the nature of the beneficiaries aided by the Minnesota statute. As previously
noted, the district court concluded with little scrutiny that the breadth of
the benefitted class in M.C.L.U. was similar to the breadth of the benefitted
class in Walz. 83 However, Judge Alsop in his M.C.L.U. dissent pointed out
the superficiality of this position. 8 4 Although the targeted class in
M.C.L.U. included all parents, few public school parents pay for tuition,
transportation, textbooks, instructional materials and equipment.8 5 By limit-
ing deductions to expenditures made by few public school parents, the law
primarily benefitted parents of private school children.8 6 Thus, contrary to
the district court's conclusion, the benefitted class in M.C.L.U. was similar
to that in Nyquist and distinguishable from the broad class of beneficiaries in
Walz.
78. Id. at 1320.
79. Id.
80. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
81. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
82. 452 F. Supp. at 1320-22.
83. Id. at 1321-22.
84. As Judge Alsop stated in his dissenting opinion:
The fact that § 290.09(22) applies to taxpayers whose dependents attend public
schools is without practical significance. Although a taxpayer may be obligated to
pay tuition for a dependent who attends a public school in a school district other
than the district in which the student resides, Minn. Stat. § 123.39(5) (1978), the
number of taxpayers actually affected by the obligation to pay such tuition is so
limited that application of the deduction to such persons broadens the scope of
Minn. Stat. § 290.09(22) (1976) only imperceptibly beyond the scope of N.Y. Tax
Law § 612 (Supp. 1972-73) [Nyquist]. Obviously the tax reductions . . . flow primar-
ily to taxpayers whose dependents attend sectarian nonpublic schools.
Id. at 1323.
Minnesota law presently requires transportation and textbooks be provided to public school
children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 123.39 (West Supp. 1978) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.223
(West Supp. 1978). Additionally, the State provides transportation to private school children on
an equal basis to that provided public school children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 123.78 (West
Supp. 1978). Additional aid in the form of textbooks, health services, and instructional materials
is also provided private school children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 123.931-123.938 (West
Supp. 1978).




The second serious analytical flaw in the district court's reasoning was its
failure to scrutinize the employment of the aid provided by the Minnesota
statute. This failure caused the court to misread Nyquist and to disregard
Wolman v. Walter.87  The court misinterpreted Nyquist as prohibiting a
particular form of aid-tax credits."" As previously pointed out, however,
Nyquist did not hold the statute unconstitutional because the tax credit
mechanism was, in itself, impermissible. Rather, the Court struck down the
legislation because the unrestricted aid provided by that mechanism,
maintenance grants and tuition relief, could be employed to support religious
activities.8 9 Because the court did not focus on the employment of the aid,
it also failed to accord Wolman significant weight. The court limited its dis-
cussion of the case to a footnote. 90 Even this cursory review of the decision
was distorted since the district court neglected to look beyond the holding in
Wolman to determine the Supreme Court's reasoning. 9 1 Wolman prohib-
ited the loan of instructional materials and equipment to sectarian school
children because their use could not be limited to secular purposes.
92
Thus, the M.C.L.U. court disregarded a Supreme Court decision which bore
directly on the issue. In the face of a proper Wolman interpretation, it
would have been very difficult for the district court to have found Walz
rather than Nyquist controlling. The district court then would have been
faced with two Supreme Court precedents requiring aid to sectarian schools
to be clearly restricted to secular purposes. 93 Analyzing the act before it in
light of the restriction requirements of Nyquist and Wolnan,94 the district
court should have held the deduction for tuition, instructional materials, and
equipment impermissible.
Clearly the district court's reliance on Walz was misplaced. The Supreme
Court analyzed Walz in terms of the entanglement test. 95 Of primary con-
cern to the Court was the increased governmental involvement with religion
which might result if the state taxed churches. 96 The Court noted that his-
torically governments frequently have been hostile toward religion.
9 7
Granting tax exemptions helped to guard against the dangers inherent in the
state's taxing powers. 98 Thus, granting a tax exemption to churches helped
to ensure a posture of state neutrality toward religion. 99 Interestingly, in
87. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
88. 452 F. Supp. at 1320-21.
89. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973).
90. 452 F. Supp. at 1319 n.3.
91. id.
92. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1977).
93. See notes 46-52 and accompanying text supra.
94. Id.
95. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 673.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 675.
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Nyquist," 0 as in M.C.L.U.,101 proponents of the challenged statutes relied
heavily on Walz to support the permissibility of the tax relief measures. The
Nyquist Court, however, rejected Walz as controlling, stating that special tax
benefits for private school parents were inconsistent with neutrality.10 2 Ad-
ditionally, it noted that the granting of tax benefits to parents of private
school children gave rise to increased governmental entanglement with reli-
gion. 103
Finally, the court's reliance on the Walz historical acceptance rationale to
uphold the Minnesota statute was inappropriate. The nature of a true chari-
table deduction and that of the Minnesota educational expenses deduction
are significantly different. Federal courts, 1' 4 interpreting the federal income
tax laws, and the Minnesota Supreme Court, 10 5 interpreting state tax laws,
have required that a charitable deduction be a voluntary contribution given
with no expectation of returned services. Therefore, a tax deduction covering
expenditures made for the education of one's children would not fall within
the parameters of a charitable deduction as defined by these courts.
Although the district court lamented that the Supreme Court's establish-
ment clause decisions are inconsistent, 10 6 consistency can be found in the
Court's application of a primary effect analysis. The nature of the beneficiary
aided and the employment of the aid are two factors critical to a proper
reading of Supreme Court precedents applying the primary effect test. Had
the district court's analysis been predicated on these factors, rather than on
the form of the aid provided, it would have been doctrinally sound and
less subject to error. Clearly, had the proper analysis been applied, the dis-
trict court would have found the Minnesota statute unconstitutional for hav-
ing the primary effect of advancing religion.
IMPACT
Plaintiffs in M.C.L.U. chose not to appeal the court's ruling. 10 7  Thus,
Minnesota is now able to provide tax relief to the parents of its private
school children '0 despite its previously unsuccessful attempt to do so.' 09
100. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 791 (1973).
101. 452 F. Supp. at 1320.
102. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 793 (1973).
103. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797 (1973).
104. Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309
F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
105. See Cotlieb v. Comm'r of Taxation, 245 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1976). For a discussion of
Gotlieb, see Note, Taxation: Liberal Standard Proposed for Deducting Charitable Contributions
to Religious Schools, 61 MINN. L. REv. 887 (1977).
106. 452 F. Supp. at 1320.
107. Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 10, 1978, § B (State News) at 2.
108. The challenged statute in M.C.L.U. represented Minnesota's second attempt to provide
tax relief to the parents of its private school children. For a discussion of the first, see note 9
and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
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On a national scale, advocates of tax relief measures for private school par-
ents will no doubt herald this decision, particularly because in rendering it,
the district court distinguished Nyquist. Presumably, the Supreme Court's
Nyquist decision had tolled the death knell for tax relief measures of this
nature. 110  Numerous state tax credit provisions " and one state tax deduc-
tion provision 112 had been struck down in its wake. By distinguishing
Nyquist, however, the M.C.L.U. decision could provide renewed impetus to
efforts to pass comparable tax measures in other states. 1 3  Therefore, al-
though the Supreme Court has stated that the establishment clause princi-
ples in state aid cases have been fully articulated, 1 14 the M.C.L.U. holding
indicates that in the future the Court may need to decide the permissibility
of this type of tax deduction provision.
Linda E. Davidson
110. For a discussion of Nyquist's effect on state aid to sectarian schools, see Piekarski,
Nyquist and Public Aid to Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 247 (1975).
111. A California plan was invalidated by summary affirmance in Franchise Tax Bd. v. United
Americans for Pub. Schools, 419 U.S. 890 (1974) (not reported below). An Ohio plan was invali-
dated in Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), aff'g Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744
(S.D. Ohio 1972). For the Minnesota Supreme Court case invalidating that state's credit plan,
see notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text supra.
112. Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, aff'd without opinion, 47
U.S.L.W. 3769 (1979).
113. Attempts to aid parents of children attending private elementary and secondary schools
have occurred at the national as well as the state level. Legislation providing tax credits for
private school parents was introduced into the 95th Congress. Originally the aid was to be
provided only to private school parents. However, an amendment adopted by the House Ways
and Means Committee made public school parents eligible for the deduction. Upon reconsider-
ation, the amendment was defeated. Some members were concerned that a federal tuition sub-
sidy would encourage states to charge tuition for their public schools. Should that occur, the
face of American free public school education would be radically altered. Tax Break Approved
for College Costs Only, 1978 CONG. Q. 903.
114. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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